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Types of Lexical Information 
o. The 	 Lexicon. 
A lexicon viewed as part of the apparatus of a generative 
grammar must make accessible to its users, for each lexical 
item, 
(i) 	 the nature of the deep-structure syntactic 
environments into which the item may be inserted; 
(ii) 	 the properties of the item to which the rules of 
grammar are sensitive; 
(iii) 	 for an item that can be used as a 'predicate', 
the number of 'arguments' that it conceptually 
requires; 
(iv) 	 the role(s) which each argument plays in the 
situation which the item, as predicate, can be 
used to indicate; 
(v) 	 the presuppositions or 'happiness conditions' for 
the use of the item, the conditions which must 
be satisfied in order for the item to be used 
'aptly'; 
(vi) 	 the nature of the conceptual or morphological 
relatedness of the item to other items in the 
same language; 
(vii) 	 its meaning; and 
(viii) 	 the phonological or orthographic shapes which 
the item assumes under given grammatical 
conditions. 
In this survey I shall have nothing to say about (viii), and 
nothing very reliable to say about (vii). 
1. 	 The Speech Act. 
I begin by aesuming that the semantic description of lexical 
items capable of functioning as predicates can be expressed as 
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complex statements about properties of, changes in, or relations 
between entities of the following two sorts: (a) the entities 
that can serve as •arguments• in the 'predicate•-•argument' 
constructions in which the given lexical item can figure, and 
(b) various aspects of the speech act itself. In this section 
I shall suggest the concepts and terms that appear to be 
necessary for identifying the role of the speech act in semantic 
theory. 
The act of producing a linguistic utterance in a particular 
situation involves a speak.er, an addressee, and a message. It 
is an act, furthermore, which occurs within a specific time-span, 
and it is one in which the participants are situated in particular 
places. Now the time during which a speech act is produced is a 
span, the participants in the speech act may be moving about 
during this span, and even the identity of the participants may 
change during the speech act; but for most purposes the participant-
identity and the time space coordinates of the speech act can 
be thought of as fixed points. In accepting this fiction, I 
commit myself to regarding sentences like (1) to (3) as somewhat 
pathological: 
(1) I•M NOT TALKING TO .!Q!!, I 1 M TALKING TO IQ!!.• 
(2) I WANT YOU TO TURN THE CORNER •• •RIGHT ••• HEREt 
(3) THIS WON•T TAKE LONG, DID IT? 
The producer of a speech act will be called the locutionary 
source (LS), the addressee will be referred to as the locutionary 
target (LT). 1 The temporal and spatial coordinates of the speech 
1 I have borrowed these terms from philosopher Richard 
Garner, to whom I am also indebted for a number of suggestions 
on the content and phrasing of several sections of this paper. 
act are the time of the locutionary act (TLA), the place of the 
locutionary source (PLS) and the place of the locutionary target 
(PLT). 
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There are certain verbs in English which refer to instances 
of speech acts other than the one which is being performed (e.g. 
SAY), and I shall refer to these as locutionary verbs. It is 
necessary to mention locutionary verbs now because we shall find 
that linguistic theory requires a distinction between the 
'ultimate' speech act and speech acts described in a sentence. 
Thus the linguistic description of some verbs refers to either 
the LS or the 'subject' of a locutionary verbs, 2 and these 
2The disjunction in this statement may be unnecessary if we 
accept John R. Ross's arguments that declarative sentences have 
phonetically unrealized embedding sentences representable as 
something like I DECLARE TO YOU THAT ••• On Rosa's view every 
sentence contains at least one locutionary verb, so that the 
difference we are after is a difference between references to 
the 'next higher' locutionary verb and reference to the 'highest' 
locutionary verbs. See John R. Ross, "On declar3tive sentences", 
to appear in Readings in English Transformational Gram.mar, Ginn 
and Blaisdell, 1968. 
situations must be distinguished from those in which the refer-
ence is to the LS alone. 
Words in English whose semantic descriptions require refer-
ence to some aspect of the locutionary act include HERE, THIS, 
NOW, TODAY, COME and KNOW. The word COME, 3 for example, can 
3see Charles J. Fillmore, "Deictic categories in the  
semantics of 'COME'," Foundations of Language, 1966, 2.219-227.  
refer to movement toward either the PLA or the PLT at either TLA 
or the time-of-focus identified in the sentence. Thus in (4) 
(4) HE SAID THAT SHE WOULD COME TO THE OFFICE 
THURSDAY MORNING 
it i~ understood that the office is the location of the LS or 
the LT either at TLA or on 'Thursday morning•. Uses of the verb 
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KNOW presuppose the factuality of the proposition represented by 
a following THAT-clause. Thus, in sentence (5) 
(5) SHE KNOWS THAT HER BROTHER HAS RESIGNED 
it is understood that the LS at TLA presupposes the factuali_ty 
of her brother's resignation. 
Some verbs make reference either to the subject of the •next 
locutionary verb up', or to the LS just in case the sentence 
contains no explicit locutionary verb. If we are to believe 
Ross (see footnote 2), the verb LURK requires of its subject 
that it be distinct from the subject of the first commanding 
locutionary verb. It may look, on just seeing sentences (6)-(7), 
(6) HE WAS LURKING OUTSIDE HER WINDOW 
(7) *I WAS LURKING OUTSIDE HER WINDOW 
that what is required is simply non-identity with LS; but this 
is shown not to be so because of the acceptability of sentence 
(8) 
(8) SHE SAID I HAD BEEN LURKING OUTSIDE HER WINDOW. 
From these observations it follows that sentence (9) is ambiguous 
on whether or not the two pronouns HE are coreferential, but 
sentence (10) requires the two HE•s to be different. 
(9) HE SAID HE HAD BEEN LOITERING OUTSIDE HER WINDOW 
(10) HE SAID HE HAD BEEN LURKING OUTSIDE HER WINDOW 
There are apparently many speakers of English whose use of LURK 
fails to match the observations I have just reviewed; for the 
remainder, then, this verb provides a polite example of the 
distinction we are after. 
There is, then, a distinction in semantic descriptions of 
lexical items between references to properties of the higher 
clauses that contain them, on the one hand, and to features of 
or participants in the speech act itself on the other hand. The 
former situation falls within the area of 'deep structure con-
straints' (see section 9 below), but the latter requires the 
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4availability of concepts related to the speech act. 
4There is an additional use of 'deictic' words, and that is 
this: in a third person narrative, one can express one•s ~denti-
fication' w~th one of the characters in the narrative by letting 
that character be the focus of words that are primarily appropri-
ate to .lli,-~-~· Thus we may find in an exclusively third-
person narrative a passage like (i) 
(i) 	 here was where Francis had always hoped to be, 
and today was to mark for him the beginning of 
a new life 
in which the words HERE and TODAY refer to the place and time 
focused on in the narrative, not to the place and time associated 
with the author's act of communication. In what might be refer-
red to as the 'displaced ego' use of deictic words, the author 
has shown us that he has for the moment assumed Francis's point 
of view. 
I propose that a rather subtle test of psycho-sexual identity 
can be devised in the form of a story in which two characters, 
one male and one female, do a lot of cross-visiting, but in their 
other activities do nothing that makes one of them clearly more 
lovable than the other. The subject's task is to listen to the 
story and then re-tell it in his own words. The writer of the 
original story must not use the words COME and GO; but if the 
subject, in retelling the story, states, say, that BILL CAME TO 
MARY 1 S HOUSE (using CAME rather than WENT), he reveals that he 
is experiencing the story from Mary's point of view. 
2. Elementary Semantic Properties of Verbs. 
I assume that what we might call the 'basic sense' of a 
word is typically expressible as a set of 'components', and 
that while some of these components may be idiosyncratic to 
particular words, others are common to possibly quite large 
classes of words. The components themselves may be complex, 
since they may be required to characterize events or situations 
that are themselves complex, but the ultimate terms of a semantic 
description I take to be such pre$umably biologically given 
notions as identity, time, space, body, movement, territory, 
life, fear, etc., as well as undefined terms that directly 
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identify aspects of or objects in the cultural and physical 
universe in which human beings live. In the paragraphs which 
follow, we shall sample some of the elementary semantic proper-
ties of verbs, in particular those relating to time, space, 
movement, and 'will'. 
Some verbs refer to activities viewed as necessarily 
changing in time, others do not; this contrast is frequently 
referred to with the terms 'mom~ntary' and 'continuative' 
respectively. SLEEP is a continuative verb, WAKE UP is a 
momentary verb. A continuing activity, or state, necessarily 
occupies a span of time, and thus it makes sense to qualify a 
continuative verb with a complement which represents (for 
example) one or both of the end-points of such a span, or a 
distance-measure of the span. Thus while the sentences in (11) 
make sense, those in (12) do not. 
FOR THREE DAYS1-(11) SHE SLEPT [ UNTIL FRIDAY :__) 
JFOR THREE DAYS}(12) *SHE WOKE UP "l_ UNTIL FRIDAY 
On the other hand, the negation of a momentary verb can identify 
a continuing state, and, in that case, can be continuative. 
Thus the sentences in (13) make sense. 
SHE DIDN'T WAKE UP lFOR THREE DAY0(13) \_UNTIL FRIDAY j 
Momentary verbs that represent acts that are repeatable 
may be understood •iteratively'. WAKE UP is not iterative, as 
is shown by example (12). KICK• however, can be under·stood 
iteratively, as we see in (14) 
(14) HE KICKED THE DOG UNTIL 5 0 1 CLOCK. 
Momentary verbs that are also 'change-of-state' verbs cannot be 
used iteratively when a specific object is involved, as we see 
in example (15), 
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(15) *HE BROKE THE VASE UNTIL 5 O'CLOCK 
but if the ~ame activity can be directed to an unspecified number 
of objects, then change-of-state verbs can be understood itera-
tively, too, as we see in (16) 
(16) HE BROKE VASES UNTIL 5 O'CLOCK. 
It appears, in short, that a lexico-semantic theory will have 
to deal with those aspects of the meanings of verbs which relate 
to the occurrence in time of the situations which they identify. 
Turning to other types of semantic properties, we note that 
verbs like HIT and TOUCH, though they differ in that the former 
is momentary while the latter may be either momentary or contin-
uative, have in common the notion of surface-contact, a property 
they share with KNOCK, STRIKE, CONTACT, IMPINGE, SMITE, and many 
others. They differ in that the impact of the described acts is 
apparently gentler for TOUCH than for HIT. 
The verbs LEAP and JUMP agree in implying a momentary change 
in vertical position Cone has to leave the ground in order to 
perform either of these actions), but they differ in that LEAP 
seems to imply the sense of a change in horizontal position, too. 
SLIDE, like LEAP, refers to position-changes along a surface, 
but differs from LEAP in not implying movement away from the 
surface. SCUTTLE, like SLIDE, suggests movement across a surface, 
but with the assumption that contact with the surface is inter-
rupted and with the further sense that the motion is rapid. 
DART is like SCUTTLE in referring to rapid sudden motion, but 
fails to share with it any reference to a surface. Verbs of 
motion, in short, may be described by associating with them pro-
perties relating to direction, speed, gravity, surface, etc. 5 
5Possibly the richest source of insights into verbs of 
motion is the recent output of Jeffreys. Gruber. See his dis-
sertation, Studies in lexical relations, M.I.T., (1965, 
unpublished); ''Look and see", Language (1967), Vol. 43, No. 
4.937-947; and Functions of the lexicon in formal descriptive 
grammars (1967), Technical Memorandum TM-3770/000/00, System 
Development Corporation, Santa Monica, California. 
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Sometimes a verb has a built-in reference to the outcome 
of an activity. Conceptually it appears that the actor engages 
in some activity and though the activity may be directed toward 
some specific outcome it is the activity itself which (by 
chance) leads to that outcome. These have been called 'achieve-
ment verbs'. One of the tests of an achievement verb is that 
the modal MAY is usable in construction with such a verb only 
in its epistemic or predictive sense, not in its pragmatic or 
permission-granting sense. This is apparently because of the 
'by-chance' relationship between activity and the outcome: one 
doesn't grant someone permission to have good luck. Hence we 
find (17) and (19) understandable only in the epistemic sense of 
MAY, while (18) and (20) can be understood in either the epistemic 
or the pragmatic sense. 
(17) HE MAY ACHIEVE HIS GOAL 
(18) HE MAY TRY TO ACHIEVE HIS G
(19) HE MAY FIND THE EGGS 
(20) HE MAY LOOK FOR THE EGGS 
A final general property of verbs that 




may point out in 
non-intentional 
involvement of one of the participants in the events described 
by use of the verb. If we compare (21) and (22) 
(21) JOHN MEANS X BY Y 
(22) JOHN UNDERSTANDS X BY Y 
we note that in (21), but not in (22), the association between 
x and y is intentional on John's part. The word MEAN can be 
used in the sense which UNDERSTAND has in (22), but in that 
case the sentence is differently constructed. (23) is a para-
phrase of (22). 
( 23) Y MEA.L'IS X TO JOHN. 
3. 	 Predicate Structure. 
I assume that ~ost of the 'content words' in a language 
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can be characterized in the lexicon in terms of their use as 
predicates. I take this to be true of nouns, verbs, adjectives, 6 
6 In other words, I accept the part-of-speech identities 
argued by George Lakoff in Appendix A of On the nature of 
syntactic irregularity (1965), Report No. NSF-16, Computation 
Laboratory of Harvard University; as well as the extension of 
such identities to 'nouns' proposed by Ernmon Bach in "Nouns and 
noun phrases'', (1968), to appear in Universals in Linguistic 
Theory, Holt, Rinehart and Winston (editors, E. Bach and R. Harms). 
and also a great many conjunctions. Thus a sentence like (24) 
(2h) HA..~RY LIVES AT HOME BECAUSE HE LOVES HIS MOTHER 
is evaluated as true or false depending not only on the joint 
truth-values of the two clauses which flank BECAUSE, but on the 
truth or falsity of the 'causal' connection between the two sit-
uations named by these clauses. The sentence can be interpreted 
as having BECAUSE as its main predicate, a predicate which takes 
two clauses as its arguments and which is used to assert a 
'causal' or 'logical' connection between the two clauses. 
As predicates, words can be described first of all according 
to the number of 'arguments' that they take. Thus the verbs 
ASCEi."W and LIFT are both motion verbs, they are both used to 
describe motion upward, but they differ in that while ASCEND is 
used only of the object that moves upward, LIFT requires concep-
tually two objects, one the object that is moving upward, the 
other the object or being that is causing it to move upward. 
Another way of stating this is: ASCEND is a one-argument predi-
cate, LIFT is a two-argument predicate. 7 
7or course, as motion verbs each of them may take time and 
space 'complements' as well, as is seen in THE BALLOONS ASCENDED 
TO THE RAFTERS JUST AFTER THE SPEECH ENDED. Since in general 
the nature of the time and space complements is predictable from 
properties of the type discussed in section 2, we may permit our-
selves to ignore such matters while discussing the typing of 
predicates on the basis of the number of arguments they 'take'. 
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Many verbs are flexible in the number of arguments they 
take. This is true, for example, of some motion verbs, like 
MOVE and ROTATE, and many change-of-state verbs, like OPEN and 
BREAK. MOVE, as can be seen in sentences (25)-(27), can occur 
with one, two, or three arguments. 
(25) THE ROCK MOVED 
(26) THE WIND MOVED THE ROCK 
(27) I MOVED THE ROCK (WITH A STICK) 
Mention of the object which moves is required in all three uses; 
the two-argument uses additionally identify either the physical 
force or object which is directly reponsible, or the animate 
being which is indirectly reponsible, for the activity of moving; 
and the three-argument use identified all three of these (as in 
(27) with the parenthesized phrase included). The surface-
contact verbs HIT, TOUCH, STRIKE, etc., require conceptually at 
least two arguments in all of their uses, namely the objects 
which come into contact, but they accept as a third argument the 
animate being that is responsible for the coming-into-contact. 
The verbs ROB and STEAL conceptually require three arguments, 
namely those identifiable as the culprit, the loser, and the loot. 
The words BUY and SELL are each 4-argument predicates, the argu-
ments representing the one who receives the goods or services, 
the one who provides the goods and services, the goods and 
services themselves, and the sum of money that changes hands. 
I have referred in this section to the conceptually required 
number of arguments. I am distinguishing this from the number 
of arguoents that must be explicitly identified in English sen-
tences. The various ways in which English grammar provides for 
the omission or suppression of explicitly identified arguments 
is the subject of section 5. To say that conceptually ROB or 
BUY are 3- or 4-argument predicates respectively is to acknow-
ledge that even when we say merely (28) 
(28) SHE ROBBED THE BANK 
we understand that she took something out of the bank, and when 
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we say (29) 
(29) SHE BOUGHT IT 
truthfully, it is necessarily the case that there was somebody 
who sold it to her and that a sum of money was exchanged. 
4. Case St~ucture. 
In t~e preceding section I identified the separate argu-
ments ass~ciated with the verb ROB by referring to their 'rol~s· 
as 'culprit', 'loser', and 'loot'; in a similar way, I might 
have identified the three arguments associated with the verb 
CRITICIZE as 'critic', 'offender' and 'offense'. It seems to 
me, however, that this sort of detail is unnecessary, and that 
what we need are abstractions from these more specific roles, 
abstractions which will allow us to recognize that certain 
elementary role notions recur in many situations, and which will 
allow us to acknowledge that differences in detail between partly 
similar roles are due to differences in the meanings of the 
associated verbs. Thus we can identify the culprit of ROB and 
the critic of CRITICIZE with the more abstract role of Agent, 
and interpret the term Agent as referring, wherever it occurs, 
as the animate instigator of events referred to by the associated 
verb. Although there are many substantive difficulties in deter-
mining the role structure of given expressions, in general it 
seems to me that for the predicates provided in natural lang-
uages, the roles that their arguments play are taken from an 
inventory of role types fixed by grammatical theory. Since the 
most readily available terms for these roles are found in the 
literature of case theory, I have taken to referring to the 
roles as case relationships, or simple cases. The combination 
of cases that might be associated with a given predicate is the 
case structure of that predicate. 
In addition to the apparently quite complex collection of 
complements that identify the limits and extents in space and 
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time that are required by verbs of motion, location, duration, 
etc., the case notions that are most relevant to the subclassi-
fication of verb types include the following: 
Agent (A), the instigator of the event 
Counter-Agent (C), the force or resistance against 
which the action is carried out 
Object (0), the entity that moves or changes or 
whose position or existence is in consideration 
Result (R), the entity that comes into existence as 
a result of the action 
Instrument (I), the stimulus or immediate physical 
cause of an event 
Source (S), the place to which something is directed 
E.x:periencer (E), the entity which receives or accepts 
or experiences or undergoes the effect of an 
action (earlier called by me 'Dative'). 
It appears that there is sometimes a one-many relationship 
between an argument to a predicate and the roles that are 
associated with it. This can be phrased by saying either that 
some arguments simultaneously serve in more than one role, or 
that in some situations the arguments in different roles must 
(or may) be identical. 
Thus verbs like RISE and MOVE can be used intransitively, 
that is with one noun phrase complement; the complement may refer 
just to the thing which is moving upward, or it may simultaneously 
refer to the being responsible for such motion. Thus in speaking 
simply of the upward motion of smoke we can say (30), 
(30) THE SMOKE ROSE 
and in speaking of John's getting up on his own power, we can 
say (31) 
(31) JOHN ROSE 
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The case structure of RISE, then, might be represented diagram-
matically as (32). 
(32) RISE 
(A) 0 
'· .........  "'-/
X 
The fact that there are two case lines connecting RISE with its 
one argument, end that the line labeled A has its case label in 
parentheses, reflect the fact that the argument can serve in 
just one of these roles (O) or simultaneously in both (A and O). 
RISE differs from ARISE in the optionality of A; it differs from 
ASCEND in having an 'A' line at all, and they all differ from 















8In truth, however, LIFT also requires conceptually the 
notion of Instrument. That is, lifting requires the use of some-
thing (perhaps the Agent's hand) to make something go up. It is 
conceivable that the basic case structure of ARISE and LIFT are 
identical, with grammatical requirements on identity and dele-
tion, accounting for their differences. Thus the two are shown 
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in (i) and (ii). 
(i) ARISE (ii) LIFT_....-,-_,__ 
A I 0 ~o 
I I I I I I 
X y Z X y Z 
For ARISE, however, it is required that z = y = z, and hence 
only one noun will show up. The meaning expressed by JOHN AROSE 
is that John willed his getting up, that he used his own body 
(i.e., its muscles) in getting up, and that it was his body that 
rose. For LI.Fl', however, there may be identities between x and 
z, resulting in a sentence like JOHN LIFTED HIMSELF, or there may 
be identities between y and z, resulting in a sentence like JOHN 
LIFTED HIS FINGER. RISE, then, must be described as (iii) 
(iii) RISE 
(A~  
I I I  
X y Z 
where the identity requirements of ARISE obtain just in case x 
and y are present. 
Frequently a linguistically codable event is one which in 
fact allows more than one individual to be actively or agentively 
involved. In any given linguistic expression of such an event, 
however, the Agent role can only be associated with one of these. 
In such pairs as BUY and SELL or TEACH and LEARN we have a Source 
(of goods or knowledge) and a Goal. When the Source is simultan-
eously the Agent, one uses SELL and TEACH; when the Goal is 
simultaneously the Agent, we use BUY and LEARN. 
It is not true, in other words, that BUY and SELL, TEACH 
and LEARN are simply synonymous verbs that differ from each other 
in the order in which the arguments are mentioned. 9 There is 
9Th.is has, of course, been suggested in a great many writ-
ings on semantic theory; most recently, perhaps, in the exchanges 
between J. F. Staal and Yehoshua Bar-Hillel in Foundations of 
Language, 196? and 1968. 
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synonomy in the basic meanings of the verbs (as descriptions of 
events), but a fact that might be overlooked is that each of 
these verbs emphasizes the contribution to the event of one of 
the participants. Since the roles are different, this difference 
is reflected in the ways in which the actions of different parti-
cipants in the same event can be qualified. This we can say (36) 
(36) HE BOUGHT IT WITH SILVER MONEY 
but not (37) 
(37) *HE SOLD IT WITH SILVER MONEY. 
Similarly, the adverbs in (38) and (39) do not further describe 
the activity as a whole, but only one person's end of it. 
(38) HE SELLS .EGGS VERY SKILFULLY 
(39) HE BUYS .EGGS VERY SKILFULLY. 
5. Surface Realization of Arguments. 
I suggested in the previous section that the conceptually 
necessary arguments to a predicate cannot always be matched on 
a one-to-one basis with the 'cases' that are also associated 
with the same predicate. It may now be pointed out that there 
is also no exact correspondence between either of these and the 
number of obligatorily present syntactic constituents in expres-
sions containing the predicates in question. BUY, as we have 
seen, is a 4-argument (but 5-case) predicate which can occur in 
syntactically complete sentences containing 2, 3, or 4 noun 
phrases. Thus, (40), 
(40) HE BOUGHT IT (FROM ME) (FOR FOUR DOLLARS) 
in which optionally present segments are marked off by parentheses. 
The verb BLAME has associated with it 3 roles, the accuser 
(Source), the presumed offender (Goal), and the offense (Object). 
Expressions with this verb can contain reference to all three, as 
in (41), just two, as in (42) and (43), or only one, as in (44). 
(41) THE BOYS BLAMED THE GIRLS FOR THE MESS 
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(42) THE BOYS BLAMED THE GIRLS 
(43) THE GIRLS WERE BLAMED FOR THE MESS 
(44) THE GIRLS WERE BLAMED 
No sentence with BLAME, however, can mention only the accuser, 
only the offense, or just the accuser and the offense. See (45)-
(47). 
(45) *THE BOYS BLAMED 
(46) *THE MESS WAS BLAMED 
(47) *THE BOYS BLAMED (FOR) THE MESS 
An examination of (41)-(47) reveals that the case realized 
here as THE GIRLS is obligatory in all expressions containing 
this verb, and, importantly, that there are two distinct situations 
in which the speaker may be silent about one of the other arguments. 
I take sentence (43) as a syntactically complete sentence, in the 
sense that it can appropriately initiate a discourse (as long as 
the addressee knows who the girls are and what the mess is). In 
this case the speaker is merely being indefinite or non-committal 
about the identity of the accuser. I take sentence (42), however, 
as one which cannot initiate a conversation and one which is 
usable only in a context in which the addressee is in a position 
to know what it is that the girls are being blamed for. Another 
way of saying this is that (43) is a paraphrase of (43 1 ) and (42) 
is a paraphrase of (42 1 ). 
(42') THE BOYS BLAMED THE GIRLS FOR IT. 
(43 1 ) THE GIRLS WERE BLAMED FOR THE MESS BY SOMEONE. 
This distinction can be further illustrated with uses of HIT. 
In (48), a paraphrase of (48 1 ), the speaker is merely being 
indefinite about the implement he used: 
(48) I HIT THE DOG 
(48 1 ) I HIT THE DOG WITH SOMETHING. 
In (49), the paraphrase of (49 1 ), the speaker expects the identity 
of the 'target' (Goal) to be already known by the addressee. 
(49) THE ARROW HIT 
(49 1 ) THE ARROW HIT IT 
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The two situations correspond, in other words, to definite and 
indefinite pronominalization. 
Sometimes an argument is obligatorily left out of the surface 
structure because it is subsumed as a part of the meaning of the 
predicate. This situation has been discussed in great detail by 
Jeffrey Gruber (see footnote 5 above) under the label 'incorpora-
tion'. An example of a verb with an 'incorporated' Object is 
DINE, which is conceptually the same as EAT DINNER but which does 
not tolerate a direct object. 10 
10
One can, however, indicate the content of the meal in 
question, as in an expression like HE DINED ON RAISINS. 
The verb DOFF has an incorporated Source. If I DOFF some-
thing, I remove it from my head, but there is no way of expressing 
the Source when this verb is used. There is no such sentence as 
(50) 
(50) *HE DOFFED HIS HAT FROM HIS BALDING HEAD. 
There are other verbs that identify events which typically 
involve an entity of a fairly specific sort, so that to fail to 
mention the entity is to be understood as intending the usual 
situation. It is usually clear that an act of slapping is done 
with open hands, an act of kicking with legs and/or feet, an 
act of kissing with both lips; and the target of an act of spank-
ing seldom needs to be made explicit. For these verbs, however, 
if the usually omitted item needs to be delimited or qualified 
in some way, the entity can be mentioned. Hence we find the 
modified noun phrase acceptable in such sentences as (51)-(53) 
(51) SHE SLAPPED ME WITH HER LEFT HAND11 
(52) SHE KICKED ME WITH HER BARE FOOT 
(53) SHE KISSED ME WITH CHOCOLATE-SMEARED LIPS 
11
At least in the case of SLAP, the action can be carried 
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out with objects other than the usual one. Thus it is perfectly 
acceptable to say SHE SLAPPED ME WITH A FISH. 
Lexical entries for predicate words, as we have seen in 
this section, should represent information of the following kinds: 
(1) for certain predicates the nature of one or more of the 
arguments is taken as part of our understanding of the predicate 
word: for some of these the argument cannot be given any linguis-
tic expression whatever; for others the argument is linguistically 
identified only if qualified or quantified in some not fully 
expected way; (2) for certain predicates, silence ( 1 zero 1 ) can 
replace one of the argument-expressions just in case the speaker 
wishes to be indefinite or non-committal about the identity of 
the argument; and (3) for certain predicates, silence can replace 
one of the argument-expressions just in case the LS believes that 
the identity of the argument is already known by the LT. 
6. Meaning vs. Presupposition. 
Sentences in natural language are used for asking questions, 
giving commands, making assertions, expressing feelings, etc. 
In this section I shall deal with a distinction between the pre-
suppositional aspect of the semantic structure of a predicate on 
the one hand and the 'meaning' proper of the predicate on the 
other hand. We may identify the presuppositions of a sentence as 
those conditions which must be satisfied before the sentence can 
be used in any of the functions just mentioned. Thus the sentence 
identified as (54) 
(54) PLEASE OPEN THE DOOR 
can be used as a command only if the LT is in a position to know 
what door has been mentioned and only if that door is not, at 
TLA, open. 12 The test that the existence and specificity of a 
12I am only dealing here with those presuppositions which 
are relatable to the content of the utterance. It is also true, 
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of course, that (54) can be used appropriately as a command only 
if the LT understands English, is believed by the LS to be awake, 
is not totally paralyzed, etc. These matters have more to do 
with questions of 'good faith' in speech communication than with 
information that is to be understood as knowledge about individual 
lexical items. 
door and its being in a closed state make up the presuppositions 
of (54) rather than part of its meaning is that under negation 
the sentence is used to give quite different instructions, yet 
the presuppositional conditions are unaffected. 
(54 1 ) PLEASE DON•T OPEN THE DOOR 
The presuppositions about the existence and specificity of the 
door relate to the use of the definite article and have been 
much discussed in the philosophical literature on referring. 13 
13on referring see "On referring", by P. F. Strawson, Mind 
(1950) 59.320-344. 
The presupposition about the closed state of the door is a pro-
perty of the verb OPEN. 
Presuppositions of sentences may be associated with gram-
matical constructions independent of specific predicate words 
(such as those associated with the word even or with the counter-
factual-conditional construction14 ), but-;:-:hall mention here 
14F 1or some examp es see my mistitled paper, "Entailment 
rules in a semantic theory'', Project on Linguistic Analysis 
Report No. 10, 1965. 
only those that must be identified with the semantic structure 
of predicate words. If we limit our considerations to sentences 
which can be used for making assertions, we can separate the 
basic meaning of a predicate from its presuppositions, by des-
cribin~ the former as being relevant to determining whether 
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as an assertion it is true or false, the latter as being relevant 
to determining whether the sentence is capable of being an 
assertion in the first place. If the presuppositional conditions 
are not satisfied, the sentence is simply not apt; only if these 
conditions are satisfied can a sentence be appropriately used 
for asking a question, issuing a command, making an apology, 
pronouncing a moral or aesthetic judgment, or, in the cases we 
shall consider, making an assertion. 
Let us illustrate the distinction we are after with the ~erb 
PROVE in construction with two THAT-clauses. Consider sentence 
(55) 
(55) THAT HARRY IS STILL LIVING WITH HIS MOTHER 
PROVES THAT HE IS A BAD MARRIAGE RISK. 
It is apparent that if I were to say (55) about somebody who is 
an orphan, nobody would say that I was speaking falsely, only 
that I was speaking inappropriately. If PROVE has a THAT-clause 
subject and a THAT-clause object, we say that the truth of the 
first THAT-clause is presupposed, and that the verb is used to 
assert a causal or logical connection between the two clauses 
and thus (when used affirmatively) to imply the truth of the 
second clause. That this separation is correct may be seen by 
replacing PROVE in (55) by DOESN'T PROVE and noting that the 
presuppositional aspects of (55), concerning the truth of the 
first THAT-clause, are unaffected by the change. 
It is difficult to find pairs of words in which the pre-
suppositional content of one is the meaning content of the 
other, but a fairly close approximation to this situation is 
found in the pair of verbs ACCUSE and CRITICIZE. The words 
differ from each other on other grounds, in that ACCUSE is 
capable of being a 'performative', while CRITICIZE is not; and 
CRITICIZE, unlike ACCUSE, is capable of being used in senses 
where no negative evaluation is intended. In sentences (56) and 
(57) we are using ACCUSE in a non-performative sense and we are 
using CRITICIZE as a 3-argument predicate in a 'negative-
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evaluative' sense. 
(56) 	 HARRY ACCUSED MARY OF WRITING THE EDITORIAL 
(57) HARRY CRITICIZED MARY FOR WRITING THE EDITORIAL 
I would say that a speaker who utters (56) presupposes that Harry 
regarded the editorial-writing activity as 'bad' and asserts 
that Harry claimed that Mary was the one who did it; while a 
speaker who utters (57) presupposes that Harry regarded Mary as 
the writer of the editorial and asserts that Harry claimed the 
editorial-writing behavior or its result as being 'bad'. The 
content of the presupposition in each one of these verbs shows 
up in the assertive meaning of the other. 
Certain apparent counter-examples to the claims I have been 
making about presuppositions can be interpreted as 'semi-quotations', 
I believe. Some utterances are to be thought of as comments on 
the appropriate use of words. Uses of the verb CHASE presuppose 
that the entity identified as the direct object is moving fast. 
Uses of the verb ESCAPE presuppose that the entity identified 
by the subject noun phrase was contained somewhere 'by force' 
previous to the time of focus. These presuppositions, as 
expected, are unaffected by sentence negation. 
l CHASED } ,...(58) 	 THE DOG lnrDN'T CHASE TH~ CAT 
(59) .... tESCAPED J FROM THE TOWERH.c. l 	DIDN 1 T ESCAPE 
It seems to me that sentences like (60) and (61) are partly 
comments on the appropriateness of the words CHASE and ESCAPE 
for the situations being described. These are sentences that 
would most naturally be used in contexts in which the word 
CHASE or ESCAPE had just been uttered. 
(60) 	 I DIDN'T •CHASE• THE THIEF; AS IT HAPPENED, HE 
COULDN'T GET HIS CAR STARTED 
(61) 	 I DIDN•T •ESCAPE• FROM THE PRISON; THEY RELEASED 
ME. 
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It is important to realize that the difference between 
meaning and presupposition is a difference that is not merely 
to be found in the typical predicate words known as verbs and 
adjectives. The difference is found in predicatively used 
nouns as well. In the best-known meaning of BACHELOR, for 
example, the negation-test reveals that only the property of 
'having never been married' is part of the meaning proper. Uses 
of this word (as predicate) presuppose that the entities being 
described are human, male and adult. We know that this is so 
because sentence (62) 
(62) THAT PERSON IS NOT A BACHELOR 
is only used as a claim that the person is or has been married, 
never as a claim that the person is a female or a child. That 
is, it is simply not appropriate to use (62), or its non-negative 
counterpart, when speaking of anyone who is not a human, male 
adult. 
7. 	 Evaluative and Orientative Features. 
Jerrold J. Katz15 and Manfred Bierwisch16 have proposed 
15Jerrold J. Katz, "Semantic theory and the meaning of 
'good'" (1964), Journal of Philosophy 61. 
16Manfred Bierwisch, "Some semantic universals of German 
adjectivals" (1967), Foundations of Language 3.1-36. 
semantic features which treat the relation between objects and 
the human beings that deal with these objects. Katz has treated 
the semantic properties of words that relate to the ways in 
which objects and events are evaluated, and Bierwisch has pro-
posed ways of associating with words information concerning the 
ways in which the objects they describe are conceptually related 
to spatial aspects of the language-user's world. 
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For certain nouns the evaluative information is deter-
minable in a fairly straightforward way from their definitions. 
This is most clearly true in the case of agentive and instrumental 
nouns. Many definitions of nouns contain a component which 
expresses a typical function of the entity the noun can refer to. 
Thus the lexical entry for PILOT will contain an expression some-
thing like (63) 
(63) 	 profession: A of [VO Z] 
where Vis 'navigate', with the presupposi-
tion that O is an air vessel 
and the lexical entry for KNIFE will contain such an expression 
as (64) 
(64) 	 use: I of [VO I A] 
where Vis 1 cut', with the presupposition that 
0 is a physical object. 
For such nouns I assume that the evaluative feature can be auto-
matically specified from the function-identifying part of a defini-
tion. A noun which refers to a 'typical' (e.g., 'professional') 
Agent in an activity is evaluated according to whether the Agent 
conducts this activity skillfully; a noun which names a typical 
Instrument in an activity is evaluated according to whether the 
thing permits the activity to be performed easily. In these ways 
we can make intelligible our ability to understand expressions 
like A GOOD PILOT, A GOOD PIANIST, A GOOD LIAR, A GOOD KNIFE, A 
GOOD PENCIL, A GOOD LO:K, etc. 
For nouns whose definitions do not identify them as typical 
Agents or Instruments, the evaluative feature apparently needs 
to be specified separately. Thus FOOD is probably in part 
defined as (65) 
(65) 	 function: 0 of [VO A] 
where Vis 'eat' 
Food is evaluated according to properties (namely nutrition and 
palatability) which are not immediately derivable from the 
definition of FOOD, and this fact apparently needs to be stated 
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separately for this item. To call something A GOOD PHOTOORAPH 
is to evaluate it in terms of its clarity or its ability to 
elicit positive esthetic responses in the viewer, but neither 
of these notions can be directly derived from the definition of 
PHOTOGRAPH. Here, too, the evaluative feature needs to be stated 
independently of the definition of the word. 
The question a lexicographer must face is whether these 
matters have to do with what one knows, as a speaker of a language, 
about the words in that language, or what one knows, as a member 
of a culture, about the objects, beliefs and practices of that 
culture. Do we know about books that they are used in our culture 
to reveal information or elicit certain kinds of esthetic appre-
ciation, or do we know about the word BOOK that it contains 
evaluative features that allow us to interpret the phrase A GOOD 
BOOK? Do we understand the expression GOOD WATER (as water that 
is safe for drinking) because its semantic description has set 
aside that one use of water as the use in terms of which water is 
to be generally evaluated, or because we know that for most 
purposes (e.g., watering the grass, bathing) any kind of water will 
do, but for drinking purposes some water is acceptable and some 
is not? These are serious questions, but we can of course avoid 
facing them by making, with the typical lexicographer, the deci-
sion not to insist on a strict separation between a dictionary 
and an encyclopedia. 17 
17As evidence for the linguistic validity of 'evaluative 
features' I would accept a pair of words which differ only in 
the evaluative features associated with them. If, for example, 
English FOOD and FEED could always refer to the same objects 
but served in the expressions GOOD FOOD and GOOD FEED to refer 
to food that was palatable and nutritious respectively, such a 
pair would provide a good argument for the existence of evalua-
tive features as an aspect of linguistic competence. 
The distinction between lexical information about words  
and non-lexical information about things must come up in dealing  
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with Bierwischian features, too. Let us examine some of the ways 
in which speakers of English speak of the horizontal dimensions 
of pieces of furniture. If we consider a sofa, a table, and a 
chest of drawers, we note first of all that a sofa or a chest 
of drawers has one vertical face that can be appropriately called 
its 'front', but the table does not. For a non-vertically-
oriented oblong object that does not have a natural 'front', its 
shorter dimension is spoken of as its WIDTH, the longer dimension 
as its LENGTH. For the two items that do have a 'front', the 
dimension along that 'front' is the WIDTH (even though it may be 
the longer of the two dimensions), the dimension perpendicular 
to the 'front' is its DEPTH. 
Objects with 'fronts', furthermore, are typically conceived 
of as confronted 'from the outside', as is the case with the chest 
of drawers, or as viewed from the inside, as with the sofa. The 
terms LEFT and RIGHT are used according to this inner or outer 
orientation. Thus the left drawer of a chest of drawers is what 
would be to our left as we faced it, the left arm of a sofa is 
what would be to our right as we face it. 
This information is clearly related to facts about the 
objects themselves and the ways in which they are treated in our 
culture, and cannot be something that needs to be stated as lexi-
cally specific information about the nouns that name them. It 
seems to me, therefore, that the truly lexical information 
suggested by these examples is the information that must be 
assigned to the words LEFT, RIGHT, WIDE, LONG and DEEP (and 
their derivatives), and that the facts just reviewed about the 
items of furniture are facts about how these objects are treated 
by members of our culture and are therefore proper to an encyclo-
pedia rather than a dictionary. It is difficult to imagine a 
new word being invented which refers to sofas but which fails to 
recognize one of its faces as a 'front'; and it is likely that 
if a new item of furniture gets invented, the properties we have 
been discussing will not be arbitrarily assigned to the noun 
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which provides the name for these objects, but rather the words 
WIDE, LEFT, etc., will be used in accordance with the ways in 
which people orient themselves to these objects when they use 
them. That the orientation is a property of the position- and 
dimension-words is further demonstrated by the fact that the uses 
I have suggested are not by any means obligatory. If a 3' by 6 1 
table is placed in such a way that one of its 6 1 sides is inacces-
sible, with people sitting at and 'using' the other side, the 
table can surely be described as 6 1 wide and 3' deep. On the 
other hand, a sofa that is 2 miles 'wide' would probably impress 
us more as a phy.sical object than as a sofa and would most 
likely be described as being 2 miles long. 
The phenomena I have been mentioning are to be stated as 
part of the presuppositional cocponents of the lexical entries 
for the words LEFT, WIDE, etc. Uses of the word WIDE presuppose 
that the object being referred to has at least one (typically) 
horizontal dimension; and that the 'dimension' which this word 
is used to quantify or describe is either the main 'left-to-
right' extent of the object as human beings conceive their 
orientation to it, if that is fixed, or it is the shorter of 
two horizontal dimensions. The adjectives TALL and SHORT (in one 
sense) presuppose as HIGH and LOW do not, that the object spoken 
of is vertically oriented and is typically in contact with (or 
is a projection out of) the ground, and so on. Similarly the 
noun POST, as opposed to POLE, presupposes that the object in 
question is (or is at least intended to be) vertically oriented 
and in contact with the ground. Many of the features of spatial 
orientation treated by Bierwisch will take their place, in other 
words, in the presuppositional components of the semantic descrip-
tions of words usable as predicates. 
There are, however, some spatial-orientation features that 
appear to enter rather basically into the definitions of nouns. 
Of particular interest are nouns that identify conceptually 
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n-dimensional entities where these are physically realized by 
m-dimensional objects, where m )n. Thus a LINE is conceptually 
on~-dimensional, and a STRIPE is conceptually two-dimensional. 
If a straight mark on a piece of paper is viewed as a LINE, the 
dimension perpendicular to its length is its THICKNESS, but if 
it is viewed as a STRIPE, the second dimension is its WIDTH. If 
the stripe has a third-dimensional aspect (e.g., if it is drawn 
with heavy paint), it is that which one speaks of as its THICKNESS. 
These are matters that seem to be related to the 'meaning' of 
these nouns rather than to presuppositions about the objects they 
name. 
8. Functional Shift. 
Syntactically and semantically different uses of the same 
word type should be registered in the same lexical entry whenever 
their differences can be seen as reflecting a general pattern in 
the lexical structure of the language. I shall call attention to 
certain situations in which a word that is basically a noun can 
also be used verbally, and a situation in which a verb of one 
type is used as a verb of another type. 
I have already suggested that the 'sentential' portions of 
the definitions of agent and instrument nouns serve to provide 
the evaluative features associated with these nouns. In many 
cases they also serve in identifying the verbal use of these 
same nouns. If, for example, the word PILOT is defined in part 
as one who flies an airplane, a dictionary entry must show some 
way of relating this aspect of the meaning of the noun to the 
meaning of the associated verb. Perhaps, for example, in 
connection with the activity characterized as (66) 
(66) 	 VO A 
where V = navigate; presupposition: 
0 = air vessel 
one might wish to state that the noun PILOT is the name given to 
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one who professionally serves the Agent role in this activity, 
the verb PILOT has the meaning of the verb in this event-descrip-
tion. If the word is further represented as basically a Noun, a 
general understanding of 'metaphor' will suffice to explain why 
the verb PILOT can be used to refer to activities that are 'similar 
to', not necessarily identical with, the activity of a pilot in 
flying an air plane. 
If the noun LOCK is defined as a device which one uses to 
make something unopenable, then that is related to the fact that 
the verb LOCK means to use such a device for such a purpose. If 
PLASTER is defined as something which one attaches to a surface 
for a particular range of purposes, then that fact should be 
shown to be related to uses of the verb PLASTER. I have no pro-
posal on how this is to be done; I merely suggest that when both 
the verbal and the nominal use of a word refer to events of the 
same type, the event-description should, other things being 
equal, appear only once in the lexicon. 
Certain fairly interesting instances of verbal polysemy seem 
to have developed in the following way. Where one kind of 
activity is a possible way of carrying out another kind of acti-
vity, the verb which identifies the former activity has super-
imposed onto it certain syntactic and semantic properties of the 
verb which identifies the second or completing activity. 
Thus the verb TIE refers to particular kinds of manipula-
tions of string-like objects, with certain results. In this 
basic meaning of the verb, it occurs appropriately in sentences 
(67) and (68) 
(67) HE TIED HIS SHOESTRINGS 
(68) HE TIED THE KNOT 
The act of tying things can lead to fastening things, and so an 
extension of the verb TIE to uses proper to a verb like FASTEN 
or SECURE has occurred. The verb can now mean to fasten some-
thing by performing tying acts, and it is this which accounts 
for the acceptability of TIE in (69). 
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(69) HE TIED HIS SHOES 
Shoes are simply not in themselves the kinds of objects that 
one manipulates when tying knots. 
In this second use the verb TIE continues to describe the 
original activity, but it has been extended to take in the result 
of such activity. The feature that characterizes this second 
use, then, will be something like (70). 
(70) extension: Result (replace FASTEN) 
·rhe verb SMEAR, to take another example, refers to the 
activity of applying some near-liquid substance to the surface 
of some physical object. The activity of smearing something 
onto a thing can have the result of covering that thing. The 
word SMZAR has, in fact, been extended to take on the syntax 
and semantics of COVER. Thus the !original' and the extended 
uses of SMEAR are exemplified in the following sentences: 
(71) HE SMEARED MUD ON THE FENDER 
( 72) HE SMEARED THE FENDER WITH MUD 
The difference by which (71) and (72) are not quite paraphrases 
of each other is found in the meaning of sentence (73) 
( 73) HE COVERED THE FENDER WITH MUD 
By claiming that the second use of SMEAR is one in which the 
properties of COVER have been superimposed we have accounted for 
the addition to (72) of the meaning of (73), and simultaneously 
we have accounted for the fact that the extended use of SMEAR 
takes (as does COVER) the Goal rather than the Object as its 
direct object, setting the latter aside in a preposition-phrase 
with WITH. 18 
18 r believe that (72) can be read as a paraphrase of (71). 
If this is so, a correct description of the situation must be 
that in its original meanings, SMEAR permits the direct-objects 
choices seen in either (71) or (72), but in its extended meaning 
it permits only that exemplified by (72). 
The verb LOAD, let us say, means to transfer objects onto 
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or into a container of some sort. The activity of loading can 
lead to the filling of that container, and so the verb LOAD 
has taken on the additional syntactic and semantic functions of 
FILL. In this way we can account for the use of LOAD in 
sentences (74) and (75) and the similarities between (75) and 
(76) 
(74) HE LOADED BRICKS ONTO THE TRUCK 
(75) HE LOADED THE TRUCK WITH BRICKS 
(76) HE FILLED THE TRUCK WITH BRICKS 
The verbs SMEAR and LOAD have the same co-occurrences in 
their extended meanings as in their non-extended meanings. The 
verb TIE is not like that: in its FASTEN-extension it takes 
nouns that are not appropriate to its original sense. This 
means that the description of the feature indicated in the 
extended use will have to be interpreted (by lexico-semantic 
rules) in such a way that when the two verbs fail to take the 
same cases, those of the verb which identifies the resulting 
action are dominant, the characteristics of the event described 
by the other verb taking their place among the presuppositions 
of the verb in its extended sense. Thus it is presupposed of 
the FASTEN-extension of TIE that the Object is something which 
can be fastened by an act of tying. 
If the type of extension that I have been discussing in 
this section can be shown to be a quite general phenomenon of 
lexical systems Cat present it is little more than a suggestion, 
the 'evidence' for its correctness being rather hard to come by), 
then perhaps we can use this concept to eliminate certain problems 
connected with what Gruber has called 'incorporation'. LEAP is 
a verb which takes, in Gruber's system, a phrase in OVER, as seen 
in (77) and (78) 
(77) HE LEAPED OVER THE FENCE 
(78) HE LEAPED OVER THE LINE 
The preposition OVER can be 'incorporated' into LEAP, but only in 
the understanding that the associated noun is an obstacle; 19 
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19Gruber (1965), p. 24. The condition for incorporation of 
OVER into LEAP, in Gruber's words, is this: "The object of the 
preposition must be of significant height with respect to the 
subject." 
thus, the preposition OVER may be absent from (77), but not from 
(78). The theoretical issue here has to do with the way in 
which the process of preposition-incorporation is to be sensi-
tive to the size relationship between the entities identified 
by the subject and prepositional-object nounphrases. My inter-
pretation is that there is an OVERCOME-extension to the word 
LEAP, and I claim that this accounts simultaneously for the 
'obstacle 1 presupposition and for the non-occurrence of OVER in 
the extended-sense sentence. 20 
20This argument is certainly not directed against Gruber's 
incorporation process as such, only against the proposed need to 
state separately its applicability to words like LEAP, JUMP, HOP, 
etc. The quite literal 'incorporation• of OVER in OVERCOME has 
not escaped my notice. 
9. Deep-Structure Acceptability. 
Facts about lexical items that relate to the formal pro-
perties of sentences can be separated into two sets: requirements 
on the deep-structure and requirements on the surface structure. 
The former determine the acceptability of a given word in deep-
structures of certain types; the latter specify those grammatical 
modifications of sentences whose operation is determined by 
lexical information. The surface conditions are provided in the 
grammar in the form of the rules which convert deep structures 
into surface structures (transformational rules), and possibly, 
in some cases, by the elaboration of special constraints on 
surface structure. 
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I shall take the position that content words may all be 
inserted as predicates, and that their realization as nouns, 
verbs or adjectives is a matter of the application of rules. 
Therefore we need not consider part-of-speech classification 
among the types of information relevant to the lexical insertion 
into deep structures. What Chomsky has referred to as •strict 
subcategorization 121 corresponds to what I have treated here 
21Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965), 
M.I.T. Press, esp. pp. 95-100. 
in terms of the number of •argumentst a predicate takes and 
their 'case structure•. What Chomsky has referred to as •selec-
tion122 is described here with the concept •presupposition' and 
22 Ib~d, 148ff• pp. • 
is taken as being more relevant to semantic interpretation than 
to lexical insertion. 
The deep-structure requirements that are of chief interest 
for this discussion, then, are those of the type Perlmutter has 
been referring to as 'deep structure constraints' or 'input 
conditions•. 23 
23My knowledge of Perlmutter 1 s work on deep-structure and 
surface-structure constraints comes from Perlmutter's presenta-
tions at the January, 1968, San Diego Syntax conference and from 
references in papers and presentations by J. R. Ross. 
Examples, due to Perlmutter, are the requirement for BUDGE 
that it occur in a negative sentence, as shown in grammaticality 
judgments on (79) and (80); 
(79) *I BUDGED 
(80) I DIDN 1 T BUDGE 
- 97 -
the requirement for LURK (discussed earlier) that its Agent be 
non-coreferential to the Agent of the 'next higher' locutionary 
verb; or for TRY th&t its Agent be coreferential to the (even-
tually deleted) subject of the 'next lower' sentence, as suggested 
by (81) and (82) 
(81) *I TRI.2:D [i•~OR YOU] I'O FLND IT 
(82) I TRIED [FOR ME] 1'0 FIND IT. 
I have included deep-structure constraints in this survey of 
types of lexical information, but I have nothing new to say about 
them. I would like to suggest, however, that it may not be 
necessary to require the extent of detail which Perlmutter envi-
sions or the transformational apparatus which that sometimes 
entails. Where Perlmutter requires that the Agent of TRY match 
the Agent of the embedded sentence, it may only be necessary to 
require that the coreferential nounphrase in the embedded sen-
tence be the one which is destined to be the subject of that 
sentence. And where Perlmutter requires sentence (83) to be 
derived transformationally from the structure underlying (84), 
(83) HE TRIED TO BE MISUNDERSTOOD 
(84) HE TRIED TO GET TO BE MIStmDEi1STOOD 
this ~ay not b°- necessary if TRY is merely described as a verb 
which expresses, of its Agent subject, the intension and attempt 
to bring about the situation identified by the embedded sentence. 
This may be necessary in order to account for the way in which 
we understand sentence (85), 
(85) HE TRIED TO SEEM CHEERFUL 
a sentence which cannot be straightforwardly paraphrased in such 
a way as to reveal an underlying agentive notion in the embedded 
sentence. 
10. Government. 
Once a specific predicate word is inserted into a deep 
structure, its presence may call for certain modifications in 
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the rest of the sentence. The typical case of this is what is 
known as 'government•. For English the operation of the rules 
establishing 'government' associates prepositions with noun-
phrases and 'complementizers' with embedded sentences and their 
24parts. 
24The term 'complementizer' is taken from Peter Rosenbaum, 
The Grammar of F.nglish Predicate Complement Constructions, (1968) 
M.I.T. Press, and refers to the provision of THAT, -ING, etc., in 
clauses embedded to predicates. 
Thus--to consider only the association of prepositions with noun-
phrases--we speak of GIVING SOMETHING!£ SOMEBODY, ACCUSING 
SOMEBODY .Q! SOMEI'HING, BLAMING SOMETHING ,2!! SOMEBODY, INTERESTING 
SOMEBODY IN SOMEI'HING, ACQUAINTING SOMEBODY~ SOMEI'HING, and 
so on. It is certain, of course, that many of the facts about 
particular choices of prepositions and complementizers are 
redundantly specified by other 'independently motivated' features 
of predicates or are determined from the nature of the underlying 
'case' relationship, so that a minimally redundant dictionary will 
not need to indicate anything about the form of 'governed' consti-
tuents directly. Until it is clear just what the needed generali-
zations are, however, I propose using the 'brute-force' method 
and specifying the prepositions one at a time for each verb and 
each case relationship. 
11. Transformationally Introduced Predicators. 
Certain lexical items can be used as predicates semantically, 
but cannot themselves occur as surface predicate words. Such 
words will appear in the syntactic position expected of some 
other constituent (usually, I think, that of the Result consti-
tuent), and there must therefore be lexically associated with 
them some predicator word, a word that is capable of bearing the 
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tense and aspect properties that can only be attached to verb-
like elements. The constructions I have in mind are those of 
the type~ FAITH IN,~ CREDENCE TO,~ LOYAL TO, etc., 
and the predicator words I have in mind include BE, DO, GIVE, 
HA.VE, MAKE, TA.KE and others. 
12. Subject and Object. 
One of the subtlest but a the same time most apparent 
aspects of the syntax of predicate~ is the set of ways in which 
the subject/verb and verb/object constructions can be set up. 
These constructions have as their purpose--generally, but not 
always--a focusing on one 'terminal' of a multi-argument 
expression, a focusing on one particular role in the situation 
under discussion. 
I have suggested elsewhere25 that the normal choice of 
2511The case for casen (1968), to appear in Universals in 
Linguistic Theory (see footnote 6). 
subject is determined by a hierarchy of case types, and only 
those predicates which require something 'unexpected' as their 
subjects need to have such information registered in their 
lexical entry. I believe that, at least in the vast majority 
of cases, those noun-phrases capable of becoming direct objects 
of a given verb are at the same time the ones which can appear 
as the subjects of passive constructions made with the same 
verb. Thus such information at least does not need to be 
stated twice, and at best may not need to be stated at all for 
most verbs, since it is most likely subject to rather general 
statements about combinations of 'cases•. 26 
26rncidentally, verbs which are obligatorily passive are 
verbs with one associated nounphrase designated as 'direct 
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object' but none as 'normal subject'. An automatic consequence 
of this situation is that the expression will be cast in the 
passive form. 
There is an extremely interesting set of subject- and object-
selection facts that seem to operate in connection with expres-
sions of 'quantity' and 'contents•. The verb SLEEP refers to an 
'activity' of an animate being in a particular place, where the 
one who sleeps is typically mentioned as the subject; but when 
the focus is on the place and at issue is the number of different 
beings that can sleep in that place, the verb permits the Place 
nounphrase to appear as subject. We see this in sentence (86) 
(86) THIS HOUSEBOAT SLEEPS EIGHT ADULTS OR SIXTEEN 
CHILDREN. 
The verb FEED has its use as a 'causative' of EAT, but it can be 
used to express other kinds of relations with eating, too. To 
indicate the typical relation between the Agent and a description 
of the 'contents• of his eating activity, we use sentences like 
(87) 
(87) THE CHILD FEEDS ON RAISINS 
There is a relation between a recipe (which identifies, among 
other things, quantities of food) and the number of people who 
can (with satisfaction) eat the food one prepares by following 
the recipe, and this is the relation we see expressed in a 
sentence like (88) 
(88) THIS RECIPE FEEDS EIGHT ADULTS OR FOUR CHILDREN 
In the case of FEED, the eonnection between the Place and a 
quantity of 'eaters' requires the latter quantity to be a •rate'. 
Thus we get sentences like (89) 
(89) THIS RESTAURANT FEEDS FOUR HUNDRED PEOPLE A DAY. 
It is not clear to me how one can capture facts of the sort 
have just suggested in any way short of providing (in effect) 
separate lexical descriptions for each of these uses. It is 
clear, anyway, that examples (86)-(89) cannot be understood as 
merely exemplifying •causative' extensions of these verbs. 
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13. Appendix: Sample Lexical Entries. 
BLAME: -Locutionary, -Momentary 
arguments: x, y' z 
cases: Agent, Goal, Object 
prepositions: by, on, for 
normal subject: X 
direct object: y or z 
presuppositions: xis animate 
z is an activity z 1 or the result 
of z 1 
x judges [z• is 'bad'] 





ACCUSE: +Performative, +Locutionary, +Momentary 
arguments: x, y, z 
cases: Agent, Goal, Object 
prepositions: by, ¢, of 
normal subject: X 
direct object: y 
presuppositions: X and y are animate 
z is an activity 
x judges [z is 'bad'] 






CRITICIZE: +Locutionary, +Momentary 
arguments: x, y, z 
cases: Agent, Goal, Object 
prepositions: by, ¢, for 
normal subject X 
direct object: y/-z or z 
presuppositions: x and y are animate 
z is an activity z' or the result of z' 
x judges [y caused z•J 
meaning: x judges [z• is bad] 
zero for 
indefinite: x, and y if z is a 'result' 
zero for 
definite: none 
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